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The New Federal Corporation Law?
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Professor Robert Ahdieh offers to reinterpret the debate over whether
state competition for corporate charters leads to more or less optimal
results—a race to the top or bottom.1 He presents the more modest stances
taken by the debate’s titans, William Cary and Ralph Winter, and suggests
narrower differences between them than appeared in later literature.2
Referring to this “race debate” as “the starting point for the study of
corporate law,”3 Professor Ahdieh opines that the literature overvalues state
charter competition for corporate governance and underappreciates
advancing corporation law’s normative end to address the costs of
separation of ownership from control in the modern public corporation.4
The original race debate highlighted two competitive patterns: one
among states to attract charters and another among managers to attract
capital.5 In the literature, a tendency to conflate arose, Professor Ahdieh
says, in a logical misfire of the following form: states compete to promote
managerial interests and managers compete to promote shareholder
interests, ergo states compete to promote shareholder interests.6 Professor
Ahdieh reverses the misfire to look separately at the two competitive
patterns and gets a different picture.7 State competition may have
something to do with resulting corporate laws, he says, but managerial
competition for capital determines corporate governance, and that is driven
by markets, not states.8 State competition’s main role, Professor Ahdieh
concurs with Professor Jonathan Macey and others, is to control regulatory
excesses that states may otherwise impose on corporations.9
This reversal carries implications for several discussions, including
federal preemption of state corporation law. In Professor Ahdieh’s
retelling, proponents of federal preemption, concerned about a state race to
the bottom, may miss the mark; opponents of federal preemption, believing

*

Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
1 Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism
for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 255 (2009).
2 Id. at 256–57.
3 Id. at 257.
4 Id. at 257–58, 265, 292.
5 Id. at 257.
6 See id. at 257–58.
7 See id.
8 Id. at 258.
9 See id. at 258, 283 (noting scholarship produced by Henry Manne, William Carney,
Jonathan Macey and David Haddock, and Susan Phillips and Richard Zecher).
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states race to the top, may understate preemption’s potential value.10 The
reversal certainly means that one cannot simply say that federal regulation
of corporations is inefficient because it is federal.11 The current set of
institutional design choices, giving roles to both state and federal regulation
for public corporations, may be optimal, but cannot be presumed, Professor
Ahdieh concludes.12 The prescriptive upshot is to replace talk of racing to
the top or bottom with a framework that links institutional design choices
to stated objectives.13
In this Comment on Professor Ahdieh’s article, several threshold
quarrels concern what may be perceived as some overstatement in the
piece. First, it is not obvious that the question of state charter competition
is the starting point for the study of corporation law.14 Second, the article
may overstate how often or seriously scholars make or take assertions
about federal corporation law being presumptively inefficient or that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act15 is automatically suboptimal because it is a federal
rather than a state statute.16 Third, although the article suggests that it is
inaugurating a conversation, discourse transcending the race debate has
been ongoing for some time.17 Fourth, one may question assertions that
there is a lack of topics for discussion in corporation law18 or a lack of
scholarship addressing the mechanisms and roles of markets in corporate
practice and governance.19
These objections aside, what is new in the article is a crystallization of
the importance of institutional design. Professor Ahdieh may be right
about the need for greater attention to questions of institutional design in
corporate law scholarship.20 In particular, an interesting argument holds
that there is nothing inevitable about the characteristics of federal
corporation law that should be feared by devotees of state corporation law

10

See id. at 259–60, 281, 290–91.
See id. at 260.
12 Id. at 260–61, 297.
13 Id. at 260–61, 304–05.
14 Rivals include the nature of the firm, private contract versus social control, agency
theory, shareholder-manager relations, limited liability, and the internal affairs doctrine. See
infra text accompanying notes 92–94.
15 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
16 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 260, 296–97; infra text accompanying notes 80–84.
17 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44
U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 401 (1994); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the
Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 627–28 (2004).
18 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 290, 296–97, 305; infra text accompanying notes 95–
96.
19 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 260, 267–68, 273, 304; infra text accompanying notes
86–90.
20 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 306.
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production.21
First, Professor Ahdieh argues, federal corporation law may assume a
form that is just as enabling as state corporation law22—a characteristic of
state corporation law that many devotees prize as a singular virtue.23
Second, despite concern about the costs of regulatory monopoly that could
result from federal corporation law,24 Professor Ahdieh argues that state
regulatory competition is primarily about regulating regulators, something
federal preemption would also require.25 The issue is the comparative costs
of regulatory excess in the two design choices.26
The following analysis first reviews Professor Ahdieh’s corrective
account of the state competition debate and its identification of what is
significant about that competition (regulating the regulators). It critiques
discussion of implications for federal corporation law that Professor
Ahdieh highlights as among the most significant subjects to which his
article contributes, challenging some grounds for supposing that federal
corporation law would be enabling and detailing the larger quarrels referred
to above.
Nevertheless, this analysis then takes up Professor Ahdieh’s implicit
invitation to meditate on the possible form that federal corporation law may
plausibly assume. This discussion suggests that, despite longstanding
evidence, beliefs, and prescriptions to the contrary, it is possible to imagine
federal corporation law that is enabling. Recent deregulatory proposals by
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury Department”) in cognate
fields suggest examples of how this could work, involving consolidation of
regulatory power in the federal government and substantial delegation of
that power to self-regulatory organizations, especially stock exchanges.27
In turn, this deregulatory stance may be sustained when one considers that
Washington’s regulatory monopoly in securities regulation may be ending
amid globalization because numerous other national regulators and
exchanges now compete with the United States.
One practical result of global regulatory competition is that marketdriven regulation of the regulators becomes stronger. A contending

21

See id. at 297.
Id. at 270–71, 293–96.
23 See id. at 293 & n.151.
24 Id. at 293–96.
25 Id. at 294–95.
26 Id. at 260.
27 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 5–22 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY
BLUEPRINT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
22
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academic result is that opponents of regulatory competition, concerned that
it ratchets quality regulation down, may not embrace that competition
either. For them, amid capital market globalization, search for a form of
transnational consolidated supervisor may be necessary—precisely to
provide mandatory, rather than enabling, regulations. The state corporation
law race debate that Professor Ahdieh opposes may simply be replayed as
an international securities regulation race debate. Ultimately, however,
political realities accompanying the 2008–09 global economic crisis,
revealing both market failure and regulatory weakness, do not create an
auspicious time for such deregulatory reform. Proposals presented as
alternatives to the Treasury Department’s suggest just such a search for
international regulatory consolidation.28 Yet, just as Professor Adhieh
emphasizes, reform discussions—whatever shape they take—should
engage with questions of institutional design.
I.

Account and Critique

Professor Ahdieh reviews the prevailing model that links the
institutional design of state competition to concern about the separation of
ownership and control.29 Some declare that state competition puts limits on
managers that result in protecting shareholder interests. This stance has its
origins in responses to William Cary’s claim that states, coveting franchise
fees, cater to managers, not shareholders, and offer greater managerial
discretion at shareholder expense.30 Ralph Winter’s response to Cary
acknowledged this risk but explained that market forces constrain managers
to promote shareholder interests.31
The implication was that the agency cost problem of separation of
ownership from control is addressed by markets, not state competition.32
Yet Winter’s scholarly successors took him to say that state competition
negates Cary’s claim because it addresses agency costs and promotes a race
to the top, not to the bottom, Professor Ahdieh says.33 Scholars thus
“transmuted” a negative point into an affirmative one: Winter said Cary
was wrong to predict a race to the bottom, because of market forces;
Winter did not say the result would be a race to the top.34
Professor Ahdieh accordingly recasts the Cary-Winter debate in this
28

See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY 17–18, 21 (2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT], available at
http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf.
29 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 256–58.
30 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–70 (1974).
31 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–62 (1977).
32 See id. at 256.
33 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 262–63, 266–67.
34 Id. at 266–67.
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bifurcated competition model to reveal that state competition offers limited
implications for corporate governance, despite how the received story
makes state competition its engine.35 Even if the race talk is just
convenient shorthand, Professor Ahdieh notes, it has had profound
effects.36 Significant counter-implications come from amplifying the
distinct competitive patterns, especially concerning exactly what
contribution state competition makes.37 Once managerial market forces are
highlighted, they appear as the main devices to pursue corporation law’s
normative ends addressing separation of ownership from control.38
Professor Ahdieh explains that the actual role of state charter
competition is to regulate the regulators—to address the relationship
between the corporation (shareholders and managers included) and the
state.39 Managerial competition’s goal is to promote corporation law’s
normative ends, orbiting around agency cost control within the corporation
between managers and shareholders.40 The two competitions are related, so
that state competition that constrains regulators can indirectly lower costs
to managers of promoting shareholder interests.41 But the ends remain
distinct.42
State competition aligns state regulatory interests with managerial
demand as a response to that demand.43 It cannot supply good
governance.44 If managers demand weak rules, states will efficiently
produce them.45 Emphasizing managerial competition as the driver of
governance quality implies that one could reach identical substantive
results in a regime of multiple-state corporation laws or exclusive federal
corporation law.46 So defining the different objectives requires recognizing
that there are alternative ways to design institutions to advance them, which
may mean that the optimal corporation law choice is multiple-state,
exclusive federal, or a combination.47
Federal corporation law is thus among the subjects that Professor
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See id. at 267
Id. at 268.
See id. at 268–69.
See id. at 269, 273, 281–82.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 258, 273, 281–82.
See id. at 268, 273.
See id.
See id. at 281–82.
Id. at 273.
See id.
Id. at 285–86.
Id. at 296–98.
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Ahdieh highlights as implicated by his analysis.48 The standard account
that state competition drives optimal law and governance hides how
efficient regulation can result without it.49 Federalism is an institutional
design choice, not the inexorable result of a drive to efficient regulation.50
That means that federal corporation law could be efficient too.51 If
managerial competition drives state regulation to optimality, then it could
equally drive federal law to optimality.52
Professor Ahdieh acknowledges that vital to these assertions is that
resulting federal law be characterized by the same enabling element typical
of state corporation law.53 He observes that the standard account is that
state competition led to enabling corporation law.54 But he notes that he is
“unsure this is correct” and provides reasons for this uncertainty.55 He then
suggests, however, that even if it is correct, it remains possible that federal
law could be enabling even without any analogue to state competition.56
Predicting the probable form (and content) of federal corporation law is
facilitated by taking a rational-choice approach to federal regulation.57
That approach does not necessarily mean that federal law must be
mandatory—it could be enabling so that corporations continue to have
flexibility in tailoring general law to particular needs.58
The issue becomes one of the prospects of regulatory capture of
federal authorities, Professor Ahdieh says.59 Managers, amid competition
driving them to demand laws favoring shareholder interests, would demand
a federal corporation law that does so too, which should as likely be
enabling as mandatory.60 Managerial interests, aligned with shareholder
interests, would not be offset by any contending interest group, Professor
Ahdieh supposes.61
Professor Ahdieh recognizes that the political economy in Washington
may be more complex than that prevailing in the states.62 Congress may
face more competing demands than Delaware, for example, to give

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

See id. at 260–61, 296–98.
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 260–61,
See id.
See id. at 260–61, 296–98.
Id. at 293–96.
Id. at 292–94; see also infra text accompanying notes 113–114.
Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 294.
See id. at 295–96.
See id. at 296–98.
Id.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 294–95.
Id.
See id. at 295–96.
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corporation law requisite attention.63 Yet not much time is required,
Professor Ahdieh observes, especially if manager-shareholder interests
really are substantially aligned, as the conventional model assumes.64
These assertions trigger two substantive criticisms. First, Professor
Ahdieh challenges much of, but not all, the conventional model. He
challenges conventional state competition stories by explaining that state
competition does not really address agency costs, but he accepts
conventional stories that managerial market competition is about agency
costs and works, at least in the sense that managerial and shareholder
interests are substantially aligned.65 But why should that assumption from
convention be accepted? It seems as much susceptible to challenge as the
state competition claim, and Professor Ahdieh’s discussion of state
antitakeover statutes66 suggests reasons to doubt its plausibility.
Second, Professor Ahdieh rightly takes a cautious approach to this
discussion, only challenging any assumption that federal corporation law
would necessarily be more mandatory than enabling or questioning why it
would never be flexible, given managerial competition and managerial
promotion of shareholder interests.67 This is a shrewd allocation of the
burden of proof. After all, it is not possible to prove what character any
federal corporation law would have. If all that is required to ease its
opponents’ fears is that federal corporation law could be enabling, the
article proves a good case. But if one requires firmer evidence of likely
form, skeptics may be unmoved.
Professor Ahdieh does implicitly acknowledge that the Washington
environment is more complex than state environments,68 but this discussion
also warrants a critical read. That environment would include interest
groups lobbying on behalf of such constituencies as consumers, lenders,
employees, and even the environment. Professor Ahdieh suggests that
similar complexities may exist at the state level and suggests corporation
law’s occasional indeterminacy as evidence.69
But this discussion may insufficiently appreciate how state corporation
law is primarily about manager-shareholder relations. Aside from the
extraordinary case of the small subgroup of antitakeover statutes reflecting
the interests of other constituencies, those other constituencies do their
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 296
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 39–46.
Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 299–302.
See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 295–96.
Id. at 296.
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bidding in Washington. They lobby for laws imposed on corporations
through other fields of law, such as antitrust, bankruptcy, labor, tax, and
environmental law.
If the portion of corporation law addressing primarily managers and
shareholders were produced in Washington, those other interests would
come into direct play and into more direct political conflict. Professor
Ahdieh works through this interest group complexity analysis solely to
address and to dismiss as trivial any concern over whether Washington will
pay sufficient attention to corporation law.70 Washington would find the
time, no doubt. But he leaves it for later to explore how the laws likely
could look in the resulting hurly-burly.
Certainly, federal corporation laws could look more mandatory than
enabling given the more complete and complex interest-group picture.
Supporting that prediction are the mandatory character of many historical
proposals for a federal corporation law,71 much of traditional federal
securities regulation, and most of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.72 Reinforcing that prediction are express preferences that advocates of
federal corporation law have shown for precisely a mandatory body of rules
to overcome perceived weaknesses in the enabling character of most state
corporation law.73
A potentially larger objection to a federal corporation law, Professor
Ahdieh notes, is that such a regulatory monopolist in corporation law could
increase rent extraction.74 But he says it is not obvious that Congress or the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) would operate that way,
given limited evidence of having done so in the past in areas of corporate
affairs that they have regulated.75 Again, however, that occurred in an
environment where prevailing and historical political realities held that
states have power to compete.
On this contestable terrain, Professor Ahdieh cautiously emphasizes
that one need not take a firm stance on the question of whether federal
corporation law would more likely reflect a mandatory versus enabling
character.76 Again shrewdly allocating the burden of proof, Professor
Ahdieh says it is enough to observe that this line of analysis leads to a
different and potentially more productive discourse than the line of analysis
that sees state competition as the driver of corporate governance.77
70

See id.
See E. Merrick Dodd, Federal Corporation Act, 53 YALE L.J. 812, 813 (1944)
(noting that early proposals for federal corporation law were “compulsory”).
72 See infra text accompanying notes 106–135.
73 See Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49
MD. L. REV. 947, 947–49, 971–74 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 106–108.
74 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 296.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 297.
77 See id.
71
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Professor Ahdieh instances how some say any federal corporation laws,
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are bad precisely because they are
federal.78 He argues that once the distinct functions of the two
competitions are clarified, analysis must examine content on the merits,
whether coming from Washington or Delaware.79
These assertions prompt interpretive criticisms concerning Professor
Ahdieh’s characterizations of the literature and prescriptions for its
direction. The advice to put merits first seems self-evidently wise. It leads
one to wonder whether scholars have ignored the substantive content of
state versus federal law in favor of simple declarations like state
corporation law must be better than federal corporation law (or vice versa).
This does not seem obvious. True, Professor Ahdieh is in good company in
lamenting a tendency, at least among a group of scholars, to “fulminate[]”
over federal incursions into corporation law shown in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.80 But it may be overstated to say that scholars generally, or the
literature taken as a whole, do that.
Many analyses of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act engage directly with its
substantive merits, some evaluating the provisions sequentially,81 others
highlighting particular provisions.82 Even scholars known to oppose
federal corporation law analyzed the substance and character of particular
provisions.83 Such engagement with the appropriate content balance
between state and federal regulation seems quite common.84 Accordingly,
78

Id. at 260, 297.
See id. at 297.
80 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
81 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 974–77 (2003).
82 See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB
and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977–78, 980 (2005); Michael A.
Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 672, 674 (2002).
83 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 349–55 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77,
86–90 (2003).
84 See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 233
(1999). Similar confrontations occur in related fields, such as insurance and banking. See,
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20 (1993);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77
IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1105–08 (1992); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to
Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994–97 (1992).
79
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Professor Ahdieh’s prescription for scholars to engage in specific debates
over what is optimal to reduce agency costs, rather than general debates of
state versus federal law,85 seems both sound and already taken.
Similarly, it seems self-evident that participants cannot assume or
deduce from capital market efficiency any particular institutional design
choice, since managerial capital market competition and state charter
competition do different things. Professor Ahdieh observes that one can
believe in efficient capital markets and still support federal corporation
law; one can be skeptical of efficient capital markets and still prefer state
corporation law.86 The issue is relative capital market efficiency and
strength.87
Professor Ahdieh’s prescription for scholars to study
mechanisms and limits of informational efficiency in capital markets thus
likewise seems sound.88 Again, however, this work has been undertaken
extensively in the scholarly literature89 and enjoys a visible place in
resulting teaching materials.90
Nor is it obvious that the question of state charter competition is the
“starting point” for the study of corporation law that Professor Ahdieh says
it is.91 Rivals include the nature of the firm, private contract versus social
control, agency theory, shareholder-manager relations, limited liability, and
the internal affairs doctrine. Similarly, it may not be fair to say, as
Professor Ahdieh does, that federalism and state competition are
corporation law’s “central questions”92 or certainly that the literature is
“single-minded” about these.93
Scores of issues in corporation law discourse have little or nothing to
do with federalism or state competition, revealed in many syllabi for the
corporations course and casebook tables of contents.94 This also makes one
85

See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.
See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 305.
87 See id. at 303–04
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546,
547–48 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541 (2007); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 765 (1985).
90 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–
38 (6th ed. 2008); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 195–
203 (6th ed. 2004); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS FOR AN ADVANCED COURSE IN CORPORATIONS 221–275
(3d ed. 2006); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 204–206 (2006).
91 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 257.
92 Id. at 261.
93 Id. at 297 n.164, 305.
94 See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
86
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question the article’s assertions that there is a lack of topics for discussion
in corporation law95 and possibly to bristle at some of the article’s
ungenerous characterizations of corporate law scholarship.96
Still, it does seem desirable to dislodge any absolutist or binary topbottom framing in favor of attention to institutional complexity, as
Professor Ahdieh recommends.97 It seems particularly desirable to
consider Professor Ahdieh’s ultimate point that the importance of
institutional design in corporation law may receive too little attention.98
More granular studies of federalism’s effects might be useful, as Professor
Ahdieh concludes, to decide which institutions are better at what.99 The
following discussion accepts a modified form of Professor Ahdieh’s
invitation.
II.

Federal Corporation Law’s Potential Character

Professor Ahdieh suggests there is nothing inevitable about a federal
corporation law’s character along the spectrum from mandatory to
enabling.100 It is worth noting that the mandatory-enabling distinction,
although often critical to the state-federal debate, is not the only one
relevant to opponents of federal corporation law. Others, in addition to
concerns about regulatory monopoly, include fears that it would be heavy
with rules, not principles-oriented, and too regulatory rather than
deferential.101 To imagine the form of federal corporation law in those
terms, first consider traditional suppositions and inferential evidence
tending to support conventional suspicion, which Professor Ahdieh
implicitly critiques, and then more contemporary proposals and
implications that support the contrary possibility, which Professor Ahdieh
says we should consider.

ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS xvi–xxvi (6th ed. 2005) (listing the
following topics in the table of contents that have little or nothing to do with federalism or
state competition: limited liability and veil piercing, capitalization and dividends,
oppression, cumulative voting, fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders,
changes in control, and derivative litigation and indemnification). By comparison, the
foregoing casebook devotes a total of six pages to the “race” issue, emphasizing the
substantial congruence of corporation law across states. See id. at 19–20, 227–30.
95 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 290, 297, 305.
96 See, e.g., id. at 270–72, 302–03.
97 See id. at 281, 302–03, 306–07.
98 See id. at 260–61, 297–98, 305–06.
99 See id. at 297–98, 306–07.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 22, 53–64.
101 See infra text accompanying notes 109–110.
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There may be only limited historical grounds to accept the possibility
that a federal corporation law could be enabling. Since the 1940s,
proposals for and drafts of a federal corporation act have existed.102 One of
the first, drawn directly from the Illinois state corporation statute, was
explicitly enabling.103 Today’s Model Business Corporation Act (“Model
Act”) traces its lineage to early proposals for a federal corporation act.104
Most, though not all, of the content of the original versions, and of today’s
Model Act, epitomize the enabling character of state corporation law.105
On the other hand, some versions of proposals for the Model Act were
rejected as too restrictive—too mandatory, i.e., not enabling—and these
were often prepared with a view toward fighting off federal preemption
efforts.106 In addition, federalism issues were implicated in debate leading
to promulgation of the American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance
Code, in which many detect a more mandatory than enabling character.107
It also is true that many advocates of federal corporation law exhibit
commitment to a more stringent, mandatory system of regulation.108
Furthermore, many scholars and judges promote Delaware corporation
law as “principles-based,” especially when contrasting it with federal
securities regulation, which they allege to be “rules-based.”109 Others
believe that the purpose of the asserted rules-density of federal securities
regulation is precisely to overcome deficiencies of state corporation law’s
perceived penchant for principles.110 Although there is reason to question
the clarity of these classifications,111 discussions suggest an appetite among
devotees of federal corporation law for rules whereas proponents of state
corporation law tend to prefer principles.112
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See Thompson, supra note 84, at 223.
See Dodd, supra note 71, at 812, 818.
104 See Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW.
63, 63 (2000).
105 See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 453, 453–54 (1997) (noting that although the Model Act includes some mandatory
provisions, their continued existence “is in doubt,” and overall the Model Act “reflects th[e]
trend toward enabling acts”).
106 See Thompson, supra note 84, at 223.
107 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 984, 985, 999–1000 (1993); see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 223 & n.52.
108 See Seligman, supra note 73, at 949, 971–74.
109 Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “PrinciplesBased Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1411, 1446 (2007) (citing Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law
Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 20–23 (2005)).
110 Id. (citing Mark J. Roe, Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West
1, 5–7 (Dec. 17, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/conf/conf03/papers/roe.pdf (Sept. 19, 2003 version)).
111 See id. at 1420–23, 1446–52.
112 See id. at 1446–52.
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Accordingly, there is at least some inferential, experience-based reason
for opponents of federal corporation law to assume that it would adopt a
more mandatory and rule-like character than laws that states have
produced. In addition, the evidence is reasonably strong that the enabling
quality of state corporation law is traceable to competition among the
states,113 and that the use of principles promoted a state’s position in the
competition.114 By contrast, the absence of competitors to a federalized
business regulation system may impair the federal institutional capacity to
generate laws bearing such qualities. Regulatory monopoly can lead more
nearly to mandatory than enabling laws, especially when regulators extract
rents by imposing excessive regulation on corporations.
It may also be difficult to identify much in existing federal securities
regulation that is more enabling than mandatory. Certainly this is so of its
most important element, the mandatory disclosure system. Critics
complain that this mandatory system is unnecessary and costly, and
contend that, absent regulation, a voluntary disclosure system would exist
and serve better.115
True, some provisions of federal securities regulation are optional and
many exhibit principle-like qualities rather than rule-like qualities.116 But
by and large the laws tend to be mandatory and many bear characteristics
of rules.117 These features may be particularly evident in subjects,
including, as examples, the regulation of broker-dealers and much of
federal law addressing insider trading,118 that traditionally had been
classified as within state corporation law rather than federal securities
regulation.119 Accordingly, historical and prevailing securities regulation
may tend to support the suspicion that a federal corporation law would bear
characteristics more nearly regulatory than deferential, at least when
compared to existing state corporation law.
Similar inferences may be drawn from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
receptions to it. The Act preempted several areas of corporation law
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See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters
and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 333 (2007).
114 See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927 (1998) (suggesting that “the indeterminacy
of Delaware [corporation] law . . . enhances [its] competitive advantages”).
115 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680–85 (1984).
116 See Cunningham, supra note 109, at 1447–48.
117 See id. at 1446–47.
118 See id. at 1431, 1447–48.
119 See infra text accompanying notes 148–158.
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traditionally handled by states.120 Most of its provisions are mandatory,121
including rules addressing board audit committees and corporate internal
controls and rules prescribing specific required or prohibited activities of
corporate officers, directors, and board committee members,122 as well as
securities lawyers123 and securities analysts.124 They even create specific
federal derivative lawsuits.125 They also dictate what auditors must do126
and how both auditing standard setters127 and accounting standard setters128
are to be organized.
Only a few of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s hundreds of provisions may
be classified as enabling. One is the provision concerning financial
expertise on audit committees.129
It assumes the have-or-disclose
approach: either a company has a financial expert on the committee or, if
not, must explain why not.130 A second is the similar approach taken to
whether a company adopts a code of business ethics. The Act required the
SEC to promulgate regulations requiring public disclosure of whether a
company has a code of ethics for senior officers and, if not, the reason why
not.131
In addition to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s largely mandatory content
supporting suspicion that federal corporation law would assume a similar
form, one may infer from scholarly receptivity to the Act additional
grounds for that suspicion. For example, many scholars who are
antagonistic to the Act also tend to oppose federal corporation law
generally132 and vice versa.133 Critics complained about not only the
mandatory nature of the Act, but about its “suffocating” regulatory
characteristics.134 Others complained of its rules-density.135 Accordingly,
120

See Cunningham, supra note 109, at 1482–83.
See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). See also Cunningham,
supra note 81, at 941–75.
122 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7241–7244, 77t, 78u, 78m, 7262.
123 See id. § 7245.
124 See id. § 78o-6.
125 See id. § 7244.
126 See id. § 78j-1.
127 See id.
128 See id. §§ 7128–7219.
129 Id. § 7265.
130 See id. § 7265(a).
131 Id. § 7264.
132 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602–03 (2005).
133 See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1195 (2004).
134 See Simon Lorne, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Pernicious Beginnings of Usurpation?, 6
SEC. IN ELEC. AGE, No. 4, at 1 (2002), reprinted in E. NORMAN VEASEY & R. FRANKLIN
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it does not seem irresponsible to conclude that there is a good basis for
predicting, contrary to Professor Adhieh’s hypothesis, that federal
corporation law would more likely exhibit a mandatory, rules-heavy
orientation rather than the enabling, principles orientation of traditional
state corporation law.
B.

New Federal Corporate Regulation

All that may change amid capital market globalization and in light of
some recent proposals to reform the U.S. financial regulation system. In
contrast to older conceptions of federal corporation law or securities
regulation, readily imaginable proposals envision an enabling, and
generally deregulatory, federal corporation law—and indeed such a federal
securities regulation.
Consider the Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure (“Treasury Blueprint”).136 Inspired initially
by concern about declining U.S. capital market competiveness,137 it was
revised and presented as a response to the global financial crisis that
manifested in March 2008.138 The Treasury Blueprint proposes a radical
reorganization and consolidation of regulatory power in the U.S. federal
government, but then imagines adopting provisions that may best be
characterized as more enabling than mandatory, more principles-rich than
rules-heavy, and more supervisory than regulatory.139 It also imagines
delegating this power to self-regulatory organizations, especially stock
exchanges.140
Particularly illuminating is the Treasury Blueprint’s proposal to merge
securities and futures regulation, which includes combining the SEC and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).141 The Treasury
Blueprint describes the agencies as using differing regulatory philosophies,
making clear that it prefers the CFTC’s to the SEC’s and that a uniting of
the agencies should result in a surviving entity and output more like the

what can be a suffocatingly complex regulatory environment”).
135 See Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACCT.
HORIZONS 61, 61 (2003) (noting discussions suggesting, either implicitly or explicitly, that
the “U.S. abandon the current allegedly ‘rules-based’ system”).
136 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 27.
137 See id. at 1.
138 See id. at 1–3, 21–22.
139 See id. at 5–22.
140 See id. at 12–13.
141 See id. at 11–12.
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former than the latter.142 All cut in favor of looser rather than stricter
imposition, as three philosophical examples suggest.
First, the Treasury Blueprint says that the CFTC uses a “principlesbased regulatory philosophy” and announces that it has characteristic
“market benefits” worth preserving in the futures area and expanding into
the securities area.143 It refers to this migration as a method to “modernize
the SEC’s regulatory approach.”144 Second, the Treasury Blueprint
recommends that the SEC mimic the CFTC’s core principles applicable to
contract markets and clearing agencies to apply to securities exchanges and
clearing agencies.145 Third, the Treasury Blueprint encourages greater
delegation of regulation to self-regulatory organizations.146 It applauds
current rulemaking by those organizations in the futures context and urges
that the same be intensified for the securities context, especially by SEC
delegation to stock exchanges along with swift and deferential approval of
stock-exchange proposals.147
The Treasury Blueprint identifies multiple substantive topics on which
current federal securities and futures regulation differ and suggests that
these be harmonized, mainly by shifting from the SEC’s mandatory, rule
orientation and toward the CFTC’s enabling, principles orientation.148
Doing so, the Treasury Blueprint says, will “enhance investor protection,
market integrity, market and product innovation, industry competiveness,
and international regulatory dialogue.”149 A brief review of some of these
topics supports the inference that the proposed federal consolidated and
delegated structure would be vastly more enabling, principles-like,
supervisory, and deferential than the existing system of securities
regulation—and potentially even more relaxed than prevailing substantive
corporation law produced by states.
First, consider broker-dealer regulation. Although federal securities
regulation has substantially, yet selectively, preempted many state laws in
this field, most of these laws derive from principles that predate federal
securities acts.150 These range from licensing to recordkeeping and capital
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See id. at 11–12, 115–18.
Id. at 11–12.
144 Id. at 11.
145 See id. at 110–11.
146 See id. at 12–13.
147 See id. at 111–13.
148 See id. at 11–12, 109–11. The Treasury Blueprint lists the following additional
topics in securities and futures regulation that it envisions requiring melding as the SEC and
CFTC merge: margin accounts and trading; customer funds; customer suitability; short
selling; insurance for institutional insolvency; SRO mergers; and agency funding. Id. at
116–18.
149 Id. at 115.
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adequacy, to basic common-law principles of fair dealing.151 As adapted
into federal law, most of these regulations tend to be mandatory and rulelike. Examples include the extensively delineated duty of fair dealing with
customers152 and duties on firms to supervise employees.153 Federal law
imposes no such explicit requirements on futures intermediaries, although
the industry’s self-regulatory organization, the National Futures
Association, sets kindred principles for members.154 The Treasury
Department recommends moving securities law from its mandatory, rulesorientation towards the futures law approach, a recommendation embracing
an enabling, principles-oriented character.155
Second, consider insider trading laws, which prohibit trading while in
possession of material, nonpublic information when occupying some
capacity of trust or other special relationship.156 As applied to corporate
officers and directors, these laws derive from state corporate fiduciary duty
principles and become a federal violation when coupled with the antifraud
provisions of federal securities statutes.157
The SEC accelerated
federalization of these laws in the mid-1980s in an enforcement campaign
that some opponents of federal business regulation considered too vigorous
or ad hoc.158
In contrast, the scope and level of legal prohibitions and risks of
insider trading in futures are narrower. A wide swath of futures markets
involves contracts that are not susceptible to insider trading. The Treasury
Blueprint notes that insider trading “prohibitions under the securities laws,
and the penalties applied, are generally considered to be much more
stringent and extensive.”159 It implicitly but clearly endorses relaxing those
151 See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271, 1273 (1995).
152 See id. at 1273, 1295–96.
153 See John H. Walsh, Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive
Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 174 (1997). See
generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer Supervision: A
Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1994).
154 See NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, NFA MANUAL/RULES (2008), available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/manualFinancial.asp.
155 See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 27, at 115.
156 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 669 (1997); see also In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 112 (1961).
157 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 112. For state law approaches, see
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912–15 (N.Y. 1969), and Brophy v. Cities Service
Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Del. Ch. 1949).
158 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 156–57, 199–202 (1990).
159 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 27, at 117.
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securities laws in favor of the approach taken in futures regulation.160 This
likewise provides a basis for imagining a federal corporation and securities
law more akin to traditional state corporation law.
Finally, consider private litigation. Investors in securities who have
been defrauded are generally entitled to sue primary culpable actors. These
rights of action have developed principally by decisional law of judges,
implying such private rights of action from the broad antifraud principles of
federal securities statutes.161 The Treasury Blueprint notes that such
investor rights to sue “may generally be more available under the securities
laws than under [futures laws].”162 The Treasury Blueprint favors
harmonizing the two bodies of law along lines of the looser approach of
futures law rather than securities law.163 Again, this furnishes a basis to
envision a deregulatory federal corporation law.164
The foregoing examples—plus the Treasury Blueprint’s listing of a
dozen such subjects—illustrate a deregulatory approach, more enabling
than mandatory, and more principles-oriented than rules-oriented, along
with considerable delegation of regulatory authority from federal agencies
to self-regulatory organizations. Although the Treasury Blueprint does not
directly discuss state corporation law or corporate governance aspects of
federal securities regulation, its philosophy and logic easily extend to those
fields.165
Extending the Treasury Department’s approach yields an interesting
conception of federalized corporation law. It offers a novel hybrid
recasting the competing stances in the decades-long debate, between
devotees of federal corporation law, who say it is necessary because state
law is too lax, and supporters of state power, who counter that state law
production creates competition that promotes superior laws. Under the
Treasury Blueprint, federalizing corporation law could occur but would be
lax and deregulatory. That is not what many champions of federal
corporation law traditionally sought, and something more akin to the
possibilities that Professor Ahdieh suggests are feasible.
Furthermore, much of federal corporation law production would be
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delegated to self-regulatory organizations in the private sector, especially to
stock exchanges. Stock exchanges would expand the scope of their
existing listing manuals, which already overlap with many state corporation
law provisions, to round out the entire subject.166 Similarly, self-regulatory
organizations could expand their existing mechanisms of dispute
resolution, including arbitration of broker-investor disputes, to encompass
disagreements between shareholders and managers traditionally litigated in
state courts.167 Stock exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations
would effectively replace states, and competition among them would
produce alternative approaches to subjects traditionally contained in state
corporation law.
Amid globalization, U.S. exchanges would compete not only with each
other but with all other stock exchanges in the world. The result would be
a broader competitive market, extending beyond U.S. states to the world’s
capital markets. Federal corporation law would become a product in
competitive global regulatory markets. If such regulatory competition is an
important contributor to laws bearing enabling characteristics, then one
may expect that resulting federal corporation law would have those
features. Certainly, market forces would be a driving engine toward the
production and characteristics of those laws.
Another question is whether any initial enabling character of federal
corporation law, promulgated substantially by stock exchanges and other
self-regulatory organizations, would be sustainable. Probing that question
can be done by putting this hypothesis in the context of the debate
addressing costs of federal securities-regulation monopoly. A group of
scholars, championing state competition in corporation law, object to the
functional federal monopoly over securities law production, arguing that
the result can be inefficient laws.
Curative prescriptions include giving securities issuers the choice of
applicable laws,168 letting stock exchanges where issuers list make the
choice,169 or mutual recognition (allowing foreign entities regulated
166 See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00 (1999), available
at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1182508124422.html (dealing with Shareholder
Approval Policy).
167 Existing dispute resolution mechanisms used by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”), the self-regulatory organization for the securities industry, may be
adapted
for
this
purpose.
See
FINRA,
About
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
168 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998).
169 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361–64, 2399–2401 (1998).

120
The George Washington Law Review
[Vol. 77:XXX
comparably elsewhere access to securities markets without local
regulation).170 Others observe that stock exchanges may already supply a
measure of functional competition171 or question the efficacy of such
choice-of-law models given national variation in other respects.172
Issues surrounding the issuer choice debate may warrant revisiting
amid globalization and technology changes that intensify stock-exchange
competition and accompanying regulatory oversight.173 These forces have
resulted in a large increase in the number of physical and jurisdictional
locations to access capital under alternative securities regulation regimes.
In the past, the United States, and especially New York, may have been the
only (or one of very few) places where large enterprises could raise
significant capital, so that U.S. federal regulation was such a monopoly.
Now, however, capital can be raised readily in numerous places in the
world, creating much more regulatory competition than previously
possible. Regulatory competition emerges in this world because stock
exchanges not only facilitate capital formation, but also supply alternative
legal regimes for issuers and other market participants.174 The Treasury
Blueprint’s express or implied visions for U.S. corporate regulation175
would enable U.S. stock exchanges to engage more aggressively in this
international regulatory competition.
Current developments, the Treasury Blueprint, and Professor Ahdieh’s
article begin to coalesce. Exchanges are competing globally, manifested in
how they have increasingly combined their operations in various ways,
ranging from direct investment by one exchange in others, strategic
alliances like joint ventures, and full mergers.176 The Treasury Blueprint
imagines U.S. stock exchanges needing to compete in precisely these
terms.177 It prescribes a relaxed regulatory environment to promote that
result, identifying federal law as the source with a loose regulatory
philosophy.178 And that is very much the kind of form that Professor
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Ahdieh’s article says is feasible.179
The observation that regulatory monopoly in securities regulation, and
maybe corporation law, in Washington is diminished amid globalization
contributes potentially competing implications for Professor Ahdieh’s
thesis. If Washington’s command of regulatory power has waned, fears of
excesses that result from regulatory monopoly may be eased. Cutting the
other way, the resulting competition is global, yielding a new form of
regulatory competition that traditional proponents of federal corporation
law may greet skeptically. For them, finding a single transnational
regulator may be desirable, precisely to establish mandatory regulations.180
These two competing stances thus suggest renewal of the old race debate in
a new form, moving from state charter competition to international stock
exchange listing competition.
Finally, however, these speculations must confront political reality.
The Treasury Blueprint is highly deregulatory, enabling, principlesoriented, and heavily reliant on delegation from federal authorities to selfregulatory organizations.
When released in March 2008, these
philosophical views may have enjoyed considerable appeal. As the entire
global financial system sailed toward the brink of devastation from then
into 2009, however, the political mood shifted radically along with it.
Amid the brewing catastrophe, those seeking regulatory reform may now
tend to favor tougher regulation, probably meaning mandatory, not
enabling, provisions and tighter rules, not looser principles.
If federal corporation law proposals were seriously considered in that
environment, along with broader proposals concerning financial regulation,
it seems more likely that the results would bear characteristics akin to
traditional securities regulation and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act rather than
characteristics of the Model Business Corporation Act or the Delaware
General Corporation Law. Even so, accompanying discourse should
address matters of institutional design, incorporating a principal point
crystallized by Professor Ahdieh’s Article.
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